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1959] NOTES AND COMMENTS 205
It is submitted that the test applied in the Hubsch case is in accord
with the technical rules of forgery, and that it is a valid test in
determining whether, under the particular fact situation, the crime of
forgery has been committed by the use of a fictitious name. However,
it may be questioned whether an area already beset with technicalities
and dubious distinctions should be further complicated by revitalizing a
test which originated in the days when forgery was a capital offense.
HENRY E. FRYE
Sales-Liability of Remote Vendor on Implied Warranty
Plaintiff,' a manufacturer of refrigerated biscuits, purchased "Snow
Ice" (an integral part of its biscuits sold for human consumption) from
a distributor, who had bought the product from the defendant ice
manufacturer. Upon finding glass in the ice, plaintiff, at considerable
expense, destroyed the biscuits and biscuit dough and recalled the
biscuits made the previous day with the glass-contaminated dough.
Plaintiff sued the ice manufacturer in federal district court to recover
these expenses. The biscuit company, conceding the lack of contractual
privity with defendant and foregoing the negligence theory, contended
defendant was liable under Texas law by reason of the Decker2 case. In
that case it was held that a non-negligent manufacturer who processed
and sold contaminated food to a retailer for resale and human con-
sumption was liable to a consumer for injuries sustained by him as a
result of eating such food. The court, after noting a trend of the
Texas courts away from the Decker holding, distinguished that case
and held it inapplicable on the ground that it involved a consumer eater
whereas the principal case involved a consumer non-eater.3 The lack
Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 163 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tex. 1958).
Jacob E. Decker & Sons. Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
"Liability in such a case is not based on negligence, nor on a breach of the usual
implied contractual warranty, but on the broad principle of the public policy to
protect human health and life." Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829. Thus privity of
contract between plaintiff and defendant is. not necessary under the Decker rule.
I The court may have been influenced by the so-called general rule that there
is no implied warranty of fitness for food where the sale is made by one dealer
to another dealer for purposes of resale, as distinguished from a sale by a dealer
to a buyer for immediate consumption. Howard v. Emerson, 110 Mass. 320
(1872); Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 197 (1813); Moses v. Mead, 1 Denio
378 (N.Y. 1845) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242 (Rev. ed. 1948) ; Perkins, Unwhole-
some Food as a Source of Liability, 5 IowA L. BULL. 6, 17-18 (1919) ; Annot., 15
L.R.A. (n.s.) 886 (1908); Annot., 22 L.R.A. 195 (1893); Annot., 14 L.R.A. 494
(1891). Texas has experienced difficulty with this rule, and there are inconsistent
cases dealing with it. Comment, 32 TEXAS L. Ray. 557, 564-66 (1954).
Other jurisdictions hold that the sale by one dealer to another dealer for purposes
of resale carries with it an implied warranty that the goods are wholesome and
fit for food. Annot, 1917F L.R.A. 472. A recent case is Draughon v. Maddox,
237 N.C. 742, 75 S.E.2d 917. (1953), 32 N.C.L. REv. 351 (1954).
No matter which line of cases is accepted, the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility would be equally available in the dealer-to-dealer sale for purposes of resale
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of contractual privity was deemed to preclude recovery on an implied
warranty theory. Accordingly, a verdict was directed for the defendant.
The Decker case had concerned the liability of a manufacturer.
Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey,4 decided the same day, resolved in favor
of the consumer the question of whether a retailer of foodstuffs was
liable on implied warranty. A review of the Texas law of implied
warranties since Griggs and Decker indicates the trend away from the
philosophy evinced by the court in those decisions. In Bowman
Biscuit Co. v. Hines,5 the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply the
Griggs rule against a wholesaler. In a five to four decision it was held
that one who had sustained injury from eating contaminated food
purchased in a sealed package from a retailer who had bought the
product from the wholesaler could not recover damages in a direct
action against the wholesaler. Four majority justices favored over-
ruling Griggs and since in their view a retailer would not be liable,
a fortiori, defendant wholesaler, who was one step further removed
from the consumer and with whom there was no privity, should not be
made liable. Four minority justices approved the Griggs rule and
said that adherence to this rule should require a finding of wholesaler
liability. The ninth justice, distinguishing between wholesaler and
retailer liability, considered Griggs inapplicable and concurred with the
"majority" in result only. Thus the Bowman Biscuit Co. case preserved
the Griggs rule but held no wholesaler liability to a consumer not in
contractual privity. Paradoxically, this ultimate state of the law was
approved by only one of the nine justices who decided the Bowman
Biscuit Co. case. 6 In two significant situations, where the container 7
as in a dealer-to-buyer sale for immediate consumption. DicIaMsoN, PRODUcrS
LI.AILITY AND THrE FOOD CoNsumFR 30 (1951) ; Perkins, supra at 18-19; Prosser,
The Implied Warranty Of Merchantable Quality, 27 MiNx. L. Rxv. 117 (1943).
North Carolina follows this latter rule in Ashford v. H. C. Shrader Co., 167 N.C.
45, 47, 83 S.E. 29, 31 (1914) and Lexington Grocery Co. v. Vernoy, 167 N.C. 427,
428, 83 S.E. 567, 568 (1914).
' 139 Tex. 623, 164 S.W.2d 835 (1942). The Griggs case, as did Decker, im-
posed a warranty on defendant as a matter of public policy. See 21 TEXAs L. REv.
454 (1942) for a discussion of these two cases.
. 151 Tex. 370, 251 S.W.2d 153 (1952), 31 TEXAs L. REv. 594 (1953), 1953
WASH. U.L.Q. 327, 10 WAsH. & LEE L. Rzv. 255 (1953).
'31 TEXAs L. Rav. 594, 597 (1953).
'In Annheuser-Busch v. Butler, 180 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)
plaintiff bought beer in a tavern, took it home, and opened it. The bottle exploded,
injuring plaintiff. Defendant was held not liable on implied warranty of fitness.
Distinguishing the Decker case in which injury was caused by eating, the court
said, [Here] there was no injury sustained as a result of eating or drinking
unwholesome food or drink. For aught we know, the beer may have been ...
harmless .... The fact that the glass bottle . . .might have been defective or
improperly filled, or improperly capped, would not necessarily change the fitness
of the beer for human consumption." Id. at 997. Accord, Jax Beer Co. v.
Schaeffer, 173 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). In 23 TEXAS L. REv. 87, 88(1944) it is said that these cases create an over-refined distinction in recognizing
liability when injury is caused by a piece of glass inside the bottle but denying
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rather than the foodstuff was defective and where the product was not
meant for immediate, internal consumption," Texas has refused to extend
the Decker rule.
How would the principal case be decided in North Carolina? Al-
though a consumer without contractual privity can proceed against
the manufacturer on the theory of breach of express warranty where
the warranty is printed on the product container,9 there is some doubt
as to whether he can recover against the manufacturer on a theory of
breach of implied warranty. Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co.10
established the rule that in the absence of contractual privity, a con-
sumer could not recover against a manufacturer on implied warranty.
However, in Davis v. Radford," which involved a consumer against
retailer for breach of implied warranty, the court stated that Simpson v.
American Oil Co.12 would permit the consumer without contractual
privity to maintain an action against the wholesaler 3 on the implied
warranty theory.14 Some authorities 5 have interpreted this Davis
dictum as authority for the proposition that North Carolina no longer
requires privity in breach of implied warranty situations. Granting
that this dictum indicates an attitude that would not require privity, it
is submitted that the Thomason decision remains the rule. Accordingly,
the plaintiff biscuit company could not recover from the ice manufacturer
in North Carolina in a direct action. However, the manufacturer might
not escape liability. The plaintiff could maintain an action against the
liability where the defective bottle itself causes injury. See PRossEa, ToRTs § 84,
at 509 (2d ed. 1955).
'In Brown v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) a manufacturer
of insecticide spray was sued by the owner of some cattle which had been killed
by the spray. Because of no contractual privity between plaintiff and defendant,
there was no breach of implied warranty. The court seemed to regard the Decker
rule as onerous.
'Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
10208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). This rule is repeated in dictum in Caudle v.
F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 110, 16 S.E.2d 680, 683 (1941) and
Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 307, 180 S.E. 582, 583
(1935).
11233 N.C. 283, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951).
1217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
'a It would appear that by this language plaintiff could proceed against the
manufacturer as well as the wholesaler, because when the privity requirement is
removed, the plaintiff can sue either the retailer, wholesaler, or manufacturer.
Heimsoth v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953).
" "In case of sale of goods for human consumption the requirement of privity
of contract is not always controlling....
"Under the decision in Simpson v. Oil Co .... it would seem that the plaintiff
[consumer] here could have maintained an action against . . . the distributor, for
the cause set out in his complaint, though he has elected to sue only the retail
dealer." 233 N.C. at 286, 63 S.E.2d at 825. It has been suggested that this
dictum should be weighed carefully against the Simpson Case, because that case
involved express warranty, whereas in the Davis case there was no express war-
ranty. 30 N.C.L. REv. 191, 194 (1952).
1" PaossER, TORTS § 84, at 509 n. 28 (2d ed. 1955).
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"Snow Ice" wholesaler, who apparentlyx6 could join the manufacturer
as party defendant so that the court could determine the ultimate liability
of the two defendants.17
What result would have obtained under the Uniform Sales Act? s
It appears that plaintiff ordered the ice by description, 9 hence there
arose the implied warranty of merchantability 20 from the wholesaler to
plaintiff. This warranty would also exist between manufacturer and
wholesaler.21  Some courts would extend the warranty to the ultimate
consumer. 22  The implied warranty of merchantability is included
in the Uniform Commercial Code. 23  However, a majority of the states
adopting these uniform acts24 still requires privity in breach of implied
warranty cases.25 Hence the plaintiff would not be able to recover
in these states.2 6
", The rule of the Davis case was that the retailer, when sued by the consumer
for breach of implied waranty, could join his (retailer's) vendor as a party
defendant.
,,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-222 (1953). The theory suggested in the text pre-
supposes that the manufacturer is subject to North Carolina's jurisdiction.
"8 The Uniform Sales Act is in effect in 33 states, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
and Panama Canal Zone. UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, SALES at 6 (Supp. 1957).
North Carolina has not adopted the Uniform Sales Act.
"9 A sale by description is any sale where there is no adequate opportunity to
inspect. Kohn v. Ball, 36"Tenn. App. 281, 254 S.W.2d 755 (1952).
.O UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15(2) : "Where the goods are bought by description
from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of
merchantable quality."
A popular meaning of merchantable quality is that goods must be reasonably
suited for the ordinary uses which they were manufactured to meet. Giant Manu-
facturing Co. v. Yates-American Machine Co., 111 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1940).
For more complete definitions of merchantability see 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 243(Rev. ed. 1948), and Prosser, supra note 3, at 125-32.
21 See note 3 supra.
2Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. App. 1942) ; Markovich
v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958) ; Baum v.
Murray, 23 Wash. 2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945). Contra, Smith v. Salem Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942), Lombardi v. California Packing
Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-314(2): "Goods to be merchantable must be at
least such as(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which suqh goods are used; . . ." The
Uniform Commercial Code is in effect at the date of this writing in Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A §§ 1-101 through 10-104 (1953)
MAss. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 106 (1957).
2 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, SALES § 15, n. 10.
However, the trend is toward abandoning the privity requirement. DICKER-
SON, PRODTS LIADILITy AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 63-65, 94-99 (1951); SMITH
AND PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 906, 912 (2d ed. 1957); 1
WLISrON, SALES § 244 n. 7 (Rev. ed. 1948) and Supp. (1957). New York seems
to have broken away recently from the privity requirement in Welch v. Schiebelhuth,
169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957), Comment, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 308 (1958), 9
SYRACUSE L. REv. 326 (1958).
f2 Regarding the Uniform Commercial Code, this result is unfortunate. Section 43
of the Uniform Revised Sales Act, which has been replaced by § 2-318 of the Code,
provided an almost complete departure from the antiquated privity requirement.
See Note, 29 IND. L.J. 173, 184-88 (1954). The Code has made a change in
the present privity requirement in that a member of the buyer's family or a guest
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The decision in the principal case is harsh in that it necessitates
circuity of action. Plaintiff can sue only the middleman, who in turn will
sue the ice manufacturer in order to place liability at the point of origin.
The biscuit company is placed in the anomalous position of being
subject to liability without contractual privity, under the Decker rule,
to a consumer who sustains injury by eating unwholesome biscuits.
Yet the company which has been diligent in preventing injury to ulti-
mate consumers by destroying the glass-contaminated dough cannot
recover its loss from the ice manufacturer because of a lack of contractual
privity.27 It is submitted that this privity requirement is law for
law's sake.28
WILLIAm H. MCCULLOUGH
Torts-Charitable Immunity
The doctrine that charitable institutions1 are immune from liability
for torts committed by their servants evolved from dictum set forth in
Duncan, v. Findlater,2 an English case decided in 1839. This doctrine
was later recognized and followed in England for a brief period; it was
completely discarded in 1866.3
McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,4 in 1876, was the
first case to adopt the doctrine in this country, the court holding that
a charity was immune from liability if it had exercised due care in the
selection and retention of its servants. Since that time a majority of
the states have followed the Massachusetts rule, but have differed greatly
of the buyer no longer is required to have privity with the buyer's vendor to
recover for breach of implied warranty. But a suit by a buyer agaiist a remote
vendor is left unchanged, therefore the majority rule requiring privity in such a
situation is left intact. Legislation, 15 U. PiTt. L. REv. 331, 352-55 (1954).
"7 Of course plainitiff could sue defendant on grounds of negligence, but in this
case this theory would be quite difficult to prove. PROSSEa, TOarS § 84, at 505
(2d ed. 1955).
28 Spruill, Privily Of Contract as a Requisite for Recovery On Warranty,
19 N.C.L. REv. 551, 565-66 (1941).
1 An institution "is deemed to be eleemosynary or charitable where its property
is derived from charitable gifts or bequests and administered, not for purpose of
gain but in interest of humanity. . . ." Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon
College, 31 F.2d 869, 870 (2d Cir. 1929).
6 Clark and Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839).
The dictum of Duncan v. Findlater, supra note 2, was followed in Holliday v.
St. Leonard's, 11 C.B.N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861). However, this case was
expressly overruled by Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93, 11 Eng.
Rep. 1500 (1866), thus repudiating the doctrine in England. See also Hillyer v.
St. Bartholomew's Hospital [1909] 2 K.B. 820; Foreman v. Canterbury Corp.,
L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
'120 Mass. 432 (1876). This case was decided ten years after Mersey Docks
Trustees v. Gibbs, supra note 3, had overruled the doctrine in England; but the
Massachusetts court relies on Holliday v. St. Leonard's, supra note 3.
1959]
